Misperceiving the Missile Defense "Grand Bargain"

The Obama Administration's decision to alter the nature of MD in Europe has been perceived in Washington's talk shops as either part of a private agreement between Moscow and Washington or a unilateral, "good will" step by the US. The administration has made the case that the decision was based on technical aspects of MD in conjunction with re-looking the Iranian missile program and a preference to work these issues through multi-lateral mechanisms. Whether or not the Obama Administration expects Russian reciprocation or would rather simply see it as a "bonus" (as Obama insisted Sunday), it is, however, unlikely that the Russians will become substantially more cooperative, whether in Eastern European and Eurasia or via Iran, and here are three reasons why:

1. The Russians were not concerned with the technical aspects of the proposed MD system; their objections were geopolitical. While there appeared to be angst over the possibility that the US would at some later date replace or retrofit the defensive missiles in Poland with offensive missiles, Russia's primary objective was halting the presence of US boots and permanent equipment in Central Europe (along with finding an issue to "stand up" to the US, see #3). The placement of US troops in Poland, whether with the PAC-3s, the SM-3s, or another arrangement under the auspices of NATO, would not likely bring Russian support for other US goals that are not direct Russian interests. If the issue for the Russians was US influence in Central Europe and the US simply alters the nature of its presence in Poland, nothing should change here minus a brief public victory dance in Moscow.

2. Russia's influence over Tehran is largely limited to the UN Security Council. The Russians, despite their overt hints, simply to do not appear to be able to influence Iranian behavior bilaterally. Providing cover for the Iranians leads to some benefits for Moscow, such as keeping Iranian gas out of pipelines to Europe and as a bargaining chip with the West, but Moscow has other interests in principle for slowing the sanctions process. First, the Russians may be willing to agree to sanction regimes enough to pressure the Europeans out of that particular arms market but Moscow could never really support jeopardizing that regime's ability to pay for Russian weapons. Second, the Russians do not want to support any sort of international governance, condoned by the UNSC or simply an accepted idea. Not only could these "interventions" harm Russian allies (eg NATO's bombing of Serbia), but it is the glue that binds Russia's relationship with China. Without Moscow's and Beijing's "respect for sovereignty," the relationship has little base and a wide vacuum in the Far East observed by both sides of the border.

3. The Putin/Medvedev regime requires an outside enemy and the US fits the bill. In order to justify some Russian internal and external actions, Putin has, inter alia, relied on whipping up anti-Americanism as a pretext for centralizing (or verticalizing) power. Putin said the day after Obama's MD announcement, “I expect that after this correct and brave decision, others will follow,” which should include “the complete removal of all restrictions on the transfer of high technology to Russia and activity to widen the membership of the WTO to [include] Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus.” Although the US and Russia quietly cooperate on a whole host of issues, de-escalating the rhetorical conflict with the US is not in Russia's interest. Russia, like Iran, requires a real or imaginary outside adversary to mobilize society and justify its close hold on power. Given Moscow's lengthy list of complaints, one might expect another to fill the void, if not the new MD configuration.