Germany's September 2009 election appears to indicate that Germany's strong relationship with Russia is driven not by partisan factions but by common elite perceptions of German national interests. Angela Merkel and the new CDU/CSU/FDP coalition, unshackled from the SPD, have shown little sign of redesigning Germany's policy toward Russia. Indeed, Berlin faces powerful structural inducements for maintaining strong relations, economically and in security affairs. However, a closer German-Russian relationship does not appear to be an accord to the exclusion of Western Europe or the U.S. in the sense of the Rapallo Treaty or the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Berlin seeks to maximize economic benefits as both an end in itself and a means for resolving security questions.
While Germany's reliance on Russian gas imports is an important factor, Berlin has other equally persuasive incentives to maintain strong ties with Moscow. First, the German economy requires additional markets to maintain the export-driven model. The Germans have noted that the decay in Russia's infrastructure will require a rebuilding of a significant portion of the Russian economy, which world-leading German logistic, construction, and machinery companies are well positioned to supply. Second, the Germans do not have the hard power to influence Russian behavior; they must rely on access to Russia and Russian leadership to exercise their soft power. This is coupled with a strong belief in German history's recent lessons for influencing the behavior of neighbors, seeing the quiet dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union the product of Ostpolitik and the securing of Central/Eastern Europe the product of EU integration. However, the window of opportunity to influence Russia's post-Soviet development might close should an insecure Russia choose to pursue a course of enmity with the West.
In modern history, German/Prussian-Russian relations have been driven by two primary factors. The first, the complimentary nature of their economies (German technology and Russian natural resources), has proven to be a force in driving the perennial European powers toward cooperation. The second, the governing of the space between them in Central/Eastern Europe, has begot both cooperation and massive destruction in ways that came to define the global order and world history. With a common understanding for the "rules of the road" in Central/Eastern Europe, the perpetual security dilemma for Germany and Russia has in bilateral relations become dormant. The reemergence of this dilemma would likely be the prime factor in any hindrance to the continued strengthening of German-Russian relations.
Saturday, October 24, 2009
Sunday, September 20, 2009
Misperceiving the Missile Defense "Grand Bargain"
The Obama Administration's decision to alter the nature of MD in Europe has been perceived in Washington's talk shops as either part of a private agreement between Moscow and Washington or a unilateral, "good will" step by the US. The administration has made the case that the decision was based on technical aspects of MD in conjunction with re-looking the Iranian missile program and a preference to work these issues through multi-lateral mechanisms. Whether or not the Obama Administration expects Russian reciprocation or would rather simply see it as a "bonus" (as Obama insisted Sunday), it is, however, unlikely that the Russians will become substantially more cooperative, whether in Eastern European and Eurasia or via Iran, and here are three reasons why:
1. The Russians were not concerned with the technical aspects of the proposed MD system; their objections were geopolitical. While there appeared to be angst over the possibility that the US would at some later date replace or retrofit the defensive missiles in Poland with offensive missiles, Russia's primary objective was halting the presence of US boots and permanent equipment in Central Europe (along with finding an issue to "stand up" to the US, see #3). The placement of US troops in Poland, whether with the PAC-3s, the SM-3s, or another arrangement under the auspices of NATO, would not likely bring Russian support for other US goals that are not direct Russian interests. If the issue for the Russians was US influence in Central Europe and the US simply alters the nature of its presence in Poland, nothing should change here minus a brief public victory dance in Moscow.
2. Russia's influence over Tehran is largely limited to the UN Security Council. The Russians, despite their overt hints, simply to do not appear to be able to influence Iranian behavior bilaterally. Providing cover for the Iranians leads to some benefits for Moscow, such as keeping Iranian gas out of pipelines to Europe and as a bargaining chip with the West, but Moscow has other interests in principle for slowing the sanctions process. First, the Russians may be willing to agree to sanction regimes enough to pressure the Europeans out of that particular arms market but Moscow could never really support jeopardizing that regime's ability to pay for Russian weapons. Second, the Russians do not want to support any sort of international governance, condoned by the UNSC or simply an accepted idea. Not only could these "interventions" harm Russian allies (eg NATO's bombing of Serbia), but it is the glue that binds Russia's relationship with China. Without Moscow's and Beijing's "respect for sovereignty," the relationship has little base and a wide vacuum in the Far East observed by both sides of the border.
3. The Putin/Medvedev regime requires an outside enemy and the US fits the bill. In order to justify some Russian internal and external actions, Putin has, inter alia, relied on whipping up anti-Americanism as a pretext for centralizing (or verticalizing) power. Putin said the day after Obama's MD announcement, “I expect that after this correct and brave decision, others will follow,” which should include “the complete removal of all restrictions on the transfer of high technology to Russia and activity to widen the membership of the WTO to [include] Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus.” Although the US and Russia quietly cooperate on a whole host of issues, de-escalating the rhetorical conflict with the US is not in Russia's interest. Russia, like Iran, requires a real or imaginary outside adversary to mobilize society and justify its close hold on power. Given Moscow's lengthy list of complaints, one might expect another to fill the void, if not the new MD configuration.
1. The Russians were not concerned with the technical aspects of the proposed MD system; their objections were geopolitical. While there appeared to be angst over the possibility that the US would at some later date replace or retrofit the defensive missiles in Poland with offensive missiles, Russia's primary objective was halting the presence of US boots and permanent equipment in Central Europe (along with finding an issue to "stand up" to the US, see #3). The placement of US troops in Poland, whether with the PAC-3s, the SM-3s, or another arrangement under the auspices of NATO, would not likely bring Russian support for other US goals that are not direct Russian interests. If the issue for the Russians was US influence in Central Europe and the US simply alters the nature of its presence in Poland, nothing should change here minus a brief public victory dance in Moscow.
2. Russia's influence over Tehran is largely limited to the UN Security Council. The Russians, despite their overt hints, simply to do not appear to be able to influence Iranian behavior bilaterally. Providing cover for the Iranians leads to some benefits for Moscow, such as keeping Iranian gas out of pipelines to Europe and as a bargaining chip with the West, but Moscow has other interests in principle for slowing the sanctions process. First, the Russians may be willing to agree to sanction regimes enough to pressure the Europeans out of that particular arms market but Moscow could never really support jeopardizing that regime's ability to pay for Russian weapons. Second, the Russians do not want to support any sort of international governance, condoned by the UNSC or simply an accepted idea. Not only could these "interventions" harm Russian allies (eg NATO's bombing of Serbia), but it is the glue that binds Russia's relationship with China. Without Moscow's and Beijing's "respect for sovereignty," the relationship has little base and a wide vacuum in the Far East observed by both sides of the border.
3. The Putin/Medvedev regime requires an outside enemy and the US fits the bill. In order to justify some Russian internal and external actions, Putin has, inter alia, relied on whipping up anti-Americanism as a pretext for centralizing (or verticalizing) power. Putin said the day after Obama's MD announcement, “I expect that after this correct and brave decision, others will follow,” which should include “the complete removal of all restrictions on the transfer of high technology to Russia and activity to widen the membership of the WTO to [include] Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus.” Although the US and Russia quietly cooperate on a whole host of issues, de-escalating the rhetorical conflict with the US is not in Russia's interest. Russia, like Iran, requires a real or imaginary outside adversary to mobilize society and justify its close hold on power. Given Moscow's lengthy list of complaints, one might expect another to fill the void, if not the new MD configuration.
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