Saturday, October 24, 2009

German-Russian Relations, вперёд!

Germany's September 2009 election appears to indicate that Germany's strong relationship with Russia is driven not by partisan factions but by common elite perceptions of German national interests. Angela Merkel and the new CDU/CSU/FDP coalition, unshackled from the SPD, have shown little sign of redesigning Germany's policy toward Russia. Indeed, Berlin faces powerful structural inducements for maintaining strong relations, economically and in security affairs. However, a closer German-Russian relationship does not appear to be an accord to the exclusion of Western Europe or the U.S. in the sense of the Rapallo Treaty or the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Berlin seeks to maximize economic benefits as both an end in itself and a means for resolving security questions.

While Germany's reliance on Russian gas imports is an important factor, Berlin has other equally persuasive incentives to maintain strong ties with Moscow. First, the German economy requires additional markets to maintain the export-driven model. The Germans have noted that the decay in Russia's infrastructure will require a rebuilding of a significant portion of the Russian economy, which world-leading German logistic, construction, and machinery companies are well positioned to supply. Second, the Germans do not have the hard power to influence Russian behavior; they must rely on access to Russia and Russian leadership to exercise their soft power. This is coupled with a strong belief in German history's recent lessons for influencing the behavior of neighbors, seeing the quiet dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union the product of Ostpolitik and the securing of Central/Eastern Europe the product of EU integration. However, the window of opportunity to influence Russia's post-Soviet development might close should an insecure Russia choose to pursue a course of enmity with the West.

In modern history, German/Prussian-Russian relations have been driven by two primary factors. The first, the complimentary nature of their economies (German technology and Russian natural resources), has proven to be a force in driving the perennial European powers toward cooperation. The second, the governing of the space between them in Central/Eastern Europe, has begot both cooperation and massive destruction in ways that came to define the global order and world history. With a common understanding for the "rules of the road" in Central/Eastern Europe, the perpetual security dilemma for Germany and Russia has in bilateral relations become dormant. The reemergence of this dilemma would likely be the prime factor in any hindrance to the continued strengthening of German-Russian relations.

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