Global Zero: Preventing a Spiral or Destroying Deterrence?

It appears that there are three primary and disparate, though not exclusive, arguments behind the "Global Zero" movement. 1. The elimination of all nuclear weapons would eliminate the possibility of their use, prevent any nuclear weapon-related accidents, and build trust among nations. 2. The tactical use of Global Zero as a "message" would be a diplomatic coup for the U.S. and the perception of its de-emphasis in U.S. doctrine would alter the motivations of nuclear weapon seekers. 3. The costs of building "game changing" hard power (also deterring the U.S.) would be significantly increased if states were unable to purchase/assemble nuclear weapons and would be forced to build conventional power, essentially freezing global U.S. military predominance.

In the April 2010 edition of The Washington Quarterly, Bruno Tertrais does not make the same distinctions in the Global Zero movement's arguments (primarily focusing on NPT obligations and the first "moral" argument), but does offer an interesting rebuttal to this movement's logic. Below are a couple cogent passages that might make one wonder: What would be a greater source of nuclear weapon proliferation -- a nuclear Iran or a perception that the U.S. security umbrella is no longer credible??

"Countries which are protected by a nuclear umbrella such as Japan or Turkey might feel less comfortable with the U.S. commitment, regardless of any soothing words that may be uttered by Washington, and reopen their own nuclear debates at home. Others in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, would be even more inclined to look for independent means to assure their protection. It would take more than just dialogue to reassure them. Smaller countries that seek to balance Western power may actually feel encouraged to develop nuclear weapons or a ‘‘breakout’’ option if they believed that the West is on its way to getting rid of them.

The history of biological weapons should be a cause for caution. Japan started its program just a few years after the 1925 protocol that banned chemical and biological weapons use was signed. The Soviet Union took its own program to the next level by establishing the Biopreparat organization in charge of developing modified pathogens immediately after the 1972 convention that banned biological weapons production was signed. Once nuclear weapons were prohibited, they would become an extraordinary trump card for any international outlaw. Meanwhile, increased reliance on conventional weapons a logical corollary of the downgrading of nuclear deterrence might actually fuel proliferation dynamics, since Western superiority has often been a key motivation in this regard."

"There is no precedent for the political challenges that would need to be confronted to transition to a nonnuclear world. These include solving most of the core issues that have dominated international politics since 1945—1950 such as Kashmir, Palestine, Taiwan, the division of the Korean Peninsula, and the conditions of European security. To claim that ‘‘eliminating nuclear weapons would remove a divisive element in relations between the United States, Russia, and China, freeing them to work together to create a regime of cooperative security’’ is tantamount to turning the problem on its head."