Saturday, June 26, 2010

The French as Deficit Hawks??

With strict austerity measures all the rage in Europe these days (everyone from the Germans and Brits to the French and Italians), I can only speculate as to the driver behind this seemingly unlikely sobering-up of once profligates.

Hypotheses:

1. The Europeans are convinced of the thought that tax cuts are more likely than spending increases to induce growth, while smaller budget deficits will inspire consumer/investor confidence and reduce interest rates. Commentary by Martin Wolf.

2. While the stubbornness and hesitancy of the Germans did not inspire confidence in the general public, the internal divides were even greater in private. Most EU states recognize that the EU emergency fund is a paper tiger and that Germany has not the will (or domestic political capital) to save even the French or Italians.

3. The above arguments, along with the global economic crisis, are suitable justifications for Western European governments to sell necessary reforms and fundamentally restructure their economies a la Deutschland to become more competitive via the rest of the world and more sustainable in the long term given demographics.

Friday, June 25, 2010

Keeping Score

The pace at which the U.S.-Russian relationship is evolving is almost dizzying. This list will be updated to keep track of developments and does not suggest each event is linked to another nor implies a single "grand bargain," though it does seem each party has a shopping list.

U.S. Benefits

-Russian support for UNSCR 1929
-S-300 sale to Iran on hold
-Russian purchase of 50 Boeing 737s
-possibility of talks on limiting tactical nukes (?)
-lifting of tariffs on U.S. poultry

Russian Benefits

-Umarov designated as terrorist
-removal of U.S. sanctions on certain Russian companies
-strong consideration for WTO from U.S.
-arms deals elsewhere in the Middle East??
-push for 123 Agreement

Thursday, June 24, 2010

Germany's Competitiveness vis-a-vis Old Europe

Short article: Germany's wage competitiveness vis-a-vis the rest of Europe is partially to do with the outsourcing of production to Central/Eastern Europe and Russia. Perhaps should have mentioned the 16 million Germans in the east with wages still much below western Germany and high unemployment.

Chechnya

Per ITAR-TASS, the U.S. State Department designated Caucasus Emirates leader Doku Umarov a terrorist.

Also interesting is Russia's recent approval of a PACE report critical of Kadyrov and, seemingly, Russian policy.

Tuesday, June 22, 2010

German European Security Cooperation Proposal

I am remiss in not of yet having addressed the new German-Russian security cooperation proposal. I think George Friedman and the folks at Stratfor did a pretty decent job.

Thursday, April 8, 2010

Frederick lebt. Not quite, but Germany has National Interests

Several interesting articles by the Financial Times and the New York Times on the growing confidence of Germany. While the return of the German "monster" is a captivating storyline, the normalization of Germany has been quietly taking place for a number of years. The Germans, however, were just quite not so vocal about it before. It has only been in the last two years that Berlin has issued more assertive public positions tied to German national interests, examples include: lobbying to veto NATO expansion at Bucharest, indignation and almost outright anger at the global financial meltdown, the adamant position on the Greek economic crisis, and growing demands regarding German personnel and language in the EU and ECB.

Two thoughts:
1. To what extent is more assertive German behavior driven by evolving national interests or conceptions thereof? And to what extent is it driven by the fragmentation in their political parties and the relative emergence of non-Volksparteien?

2. If one worries about the divergence in French-German interests, one should note the relatively quiet gulf that exists between Berlin and Washington beneath the public rhetoric. Jot down on a piece of paper where U.S.-German relations converge and diverge and one may find that Berlin and Washington have the most divergent interests and visions in the NATO area. Could Germany come to play the role of Gaulist France?

Sunday, April 4, 2010

Global Zero: Preventing a Spiral or Destroying Deterrence?

It appears that there are three primary and disparate, though not exclusive, arguments behind the "Global Zero" movement. 1. The elimination of all nuclear weapons would eliminate the possibility of their use, prevent any nuclear weapon-related accidents, and build trust among nations. 2. The tactical use of Global Zero as a "message" would be a diplomatic coup for the U.S. and the perception of its de-emphasis in U.S. doctrine would alter the motivations of nuclear weapon seekers. 3. The costs of building "game changing" hard power (also deterring the U.S.) would be significantly increased if states were unable to purchase/assemble nuclear weapons and would be forced to build conventional power, essentially freezing global U.S. military predominance.

In the April 2010 edition of The Washington Quarterly, Bruno Tertrais does not make the same distinctions in the Global Zero movement's arguments (primarily focusing on NPT obligations and the first "moral" argument), but does offer an interesting rebuttal to this movement's logic. Below are a couple cogent passages that might make one wonder: What would be a greater source of nuclear weapon proliferation -- a nuclear Iran or a perception that the U.S. security umbrella is no longer credible??

"Countries which are protected by a nuclear umbrella such as Japan or Turkey might feel less comfortable with the U.S. commitment, regardless of any soothing words that may be uttered by Washington, and reopen their own nuclear debates at home. Others in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, would be even more inclined to look for independent means to assure their protection. It would take more than just dialogue to reassure them. Smaller countries that seek to balance Western power may actually feel encouraged to develop nuclear weapons or a ‘‘breakout’’ option if they believed that the West is on its way to getting rid of them.

The history of biological weapons should be a cause for caution. Japan started its program just a few years after the 1925 protocol that banned chemical and biological weapons use was signed. The Soviet Union took its own program to the next level by establishing the Biopreparat organization in charge of developing modified pathogens immediately after the 1972 convention that banned biological weapons production was signed. Once nuclear weapons were prohibited, they would become an extraordinary trump card for any international outlaw. Meanwhile, increased reliance on conventional weapons a logical corollary of the downgrading of nuclear deterrence might actually fuel proliferation dynamics, since Western superiority has often been a key motivation in this regard."

"There is no precedent for the political challenges that would need to be confronted to transition to a nonnuclear world. These include solving most of the core issues that have dominated international politics since 1945—1950 such as Kashmir, Palestine, Taiwan, the division of the Korean Peninsula, and the conditions of European security. To claim that ‘‘eliminating nuclear weapons would remove a divisive element in relations between the United States, Russia, and China, freeing them to work together to create a regime of cooperative security’’ is tantamount to turning the problem on its head."

Thursday, March 25, 2010

Reinventing the Color Wheel in Berlin

For the last decade Germany's political landscape has been characterized by an increasing fragmentation of power from its traditional large parties (the Volksparteien) to the three smaller parties (the Greens, the FDP, and die Linke). What was to have been a return to the FRG's most traditional and comfortable coalition (CDU/CSU and FDP) has proven to be anything but stable. The coalition has been beset with fundamental policy divergences over the social system and foreign policy, often exacerbated by FDP chief and FM Westerwelle's contentious and impatient statements. In fact, the popularity of the FDP, whose 2009 Bundestag election results (15%) were a record showing, has dwindled back to regular levels (10%). This may indicate that the FDP's groundswell of support was simply a vote for stability and that similar future results should not be expected. If this is indeed the case, the Volksparteien may be forced to chose between entirely new federal coalition formations or a return to the dreaded Grand Coalition in order to form a majority government. These new coalitions are being tested on the state (Landtag) level and are illustrative of the problems besetting the parties. As the most populous Bundesland, the May Landtag elections in North Rhine-Westphalia may be an indication of Germany's future political landscape.

In August 2009 in Saarland elections, the Greens were rendered "Kingmaker" as the CDU/FDP and SPD/die Linke both received around 45% of the vote. Though traditionally closer to the SPD, the Greens turned their nose to their traditional ally and signed up with the CDU-led coalition. Lesson: the Greens appear more comfortable with the CDU and FDP than a coalition with the SPD that includes die Linke.

Also in August 2009 in Thuringia the SPD and CDU were forced back into a Grand Coalition as the CDU could not form a majority with the FDP and/or Greens and the SPD was unwilling to build a coalition with die Linke, owing to the SPD's "promise" not to cooperate with die Linke in former West German states. Later in September following elections in Brandenburg, the SPD broke their Grand Coalition with the CDU and built a coalition with die Linke. Lesson: If the SPD would like to gain or remain in power at the state level, or perhaps even the federal level, they will need to either siphon votes from die Linke or cooperate with them.

Industrial NRW, formerly a bastion of the pro-labor SPD, has been governed by a CDU-FDP coalition since 2005. Current polling by the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen in the NRW Landtag election: CDU (37%), SPD (33%), the Greens (12%), FDP (8%), and die Linke (6%). This early polling data indicates that neither Volkspartei will be able to form a majority coalition with their preferred partner. A Grand Coalition would not be optimal for either party, but remains possible. The CDU, however, appears to be silently courting the Greens behind the back of their federal-level coalition partner the FDP. Given the many problems in the federal-level CDU/CSU-FDP coalition, the first-ever CDU-Green coalition in the Hamburg Landtag seems to be quietly working. If Merkel's CDU and Westerwelle's FDP are no longer the bedfellows the parties once were, could the anti-establishment Greens and the very-establishment CDU be Germany's most viable coalition?

Sunday, March 21, 2010

Export Champion...der RĂ¼stung

According to SIPRI's latest data, Germany has moved from supplying 6% of the world's arms market (2000-2004) to 11% (2005-2009), increasing by over 100% in constant dollars. Primary exported items are submarines and armored vehicles and the top importers are Turkey, Greece, and South Africa.

In the last decade, the SIPRI database records only one German export to the Russian military (2 diesel engines ordered in 2001 and delivered in 2006). One might wonder whether the possible French Mistral sale might persuade the Germans to consider 'non-lethal' exports (like electronics, diesel engines, and other components) to the Russians.

SIPRI Recent Trends and Database


UPDATE (5/4/10): It appears the Russians are contemplating purchasing German armor (here). No word yet from the German side.

Saturday, January 2, 2010

Alarming Reassurance

The window for near-term constructive engagement between the West and Iran appears to be closing. The Iranians, apparently unable to conclude an agreement with the West for domestic or internal power struggle reasons, seem to have defiantly retrenched. Should this window indeed close, the West will likely return to step 4 or 5 of the previous strategy of sanctions. However, are the Israelis prepared to return to the same strategy? And what signals might they give if they weren't "on board"?

Recent press statements by Israeli officials seem intended to downplay the possibility of Israeli military action, highlighting both lack of capability (logistical difficulty of an air strike on Iranian facilities) and intention (willingness to await the results of negotiations). Yet, this is in sharp contrast to Israeli's previous talking points--essentially, Israel will not allow a nuclear-armed Iran. Have the Israelis backed down due to the risks involved with an attack? Are they giving the Iranians diplomatic room to reach a deal? Or are the Israelis setting up a surprise attack?

The Israelis are not debutantes to surprise attacks, doling out several devastating strikes and once lulled into complacency prior to an attack upon themselves. What sort of signals should one expect prior to an Israeli assault on Iranian nuclear facilities? If history in general is any indicator, silence and misdirection. While many of Israel's current talking points are indeed soberingly valid (and most likely indicative of Israel's true intentions), it should not be forgotten that reassurance is at the same time also a signal for impending surprises.

Note (3.17.2010): Misdirection could take the form of "headline-grabbers" not related to Iran, but Israeli actions elsewhere.